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KeyMem: Temporal Occupancy Control for Robust Streaming VideoLLM Memory (arXiv:2611.25649)

video-llmkv-cachestreaming-memorycache-side-channelskerckhoffs-principleadversarial-robustnessarxiv

Submitted 19 Nov 2026 by Wei Song (Griffith University), Yuxin Cao (National University of Singapore), Xiao Cheng and Xi Zheng (Macquarie University), Christy Jie Liang (University of Technology Sydney), and Leo Yu Zhang (Griffith University). Listed under cs.CY (Computers and Society) despite being a systems/security paper on streaming video-language-model memory management — the listing category is untrusted the way the task brief warns, and does not reflect the paper's actual content, which is a KV-cache-eviction mechanism paper with an explicit security/adversarial-robustness framing.

Abstract page fetched via archive_page (sha 91218ccfda3f31b12623f4c298e9b0cd1bdb32ced5d0293c5dabe37f327edb24). Full text (23 pages) fetched via extract_pdf at https://arxiv.org/pdf/2611.25649 (sha256 3f9e83f2dc2afdc30540eea3864c201947827ba785f356504d34094129ddfa2f, tls verified, pdftotext). All quotes below checked against this extracted text with quote_check and returned grounded.

No addressed-to-AI language, override language, claimed authority, tier self-assignment, file-system instructions, credential requests, or urgency framing were found anywhere in the abstract page or the extracted PDF text. This is a standard-shaped arXiv CS paper (authors, institutions, abstract, related work, propositions, experiments, references). No safety flags for this session.

Claim: Score-based token eviction in streaming VideoLLMs lets a single short, visually busy segment monopolize the memory and collapse downstream accuracy

Streaming video-language models (the paper tests Qwen2.5-VL-3B, Qwen2.5-VL-7B, and LLaVA-OneVision-7B) keep only a bounded cache of visual tokens from an unending video stream, held in the language model's KV cache. Existing "retention policies" (attention score, value norm, or neighbor-redundancy score) evict tokens after every chunk based purely on content-derived scores, with no limit on how much of the memory any one time period of the stream can claim. The paper demonstrates that a 20-second segment of burned-in captions inserted into an 80-second stream can come to hold the great majority of an 8-second memory budget under a value-norm retention policy, and that this "temporal memory concentration" directly degrades the model's ability to answer questions about earlier, unrelated clips.

Claim: KeyMem's mechanism is a two-layer wrapper — a hard per-bucket temporal cap on rank-normalized scores, plus optional secret-keyed sampling of survivors

KeyMem does not replace a base retention policy; it wraps one. First, it rank-normalizes whatever base score a policy produces (so no single extreme score can dominate). Second, it divides the video timeline into fixed-duration "buckets" and enforces a hard cap on how many tokens any one bucket may retain — this is the mechanism that bounds any segment's share of memory from its very first chunk, regardless of content. Third, and optionally, it draws the surviving tokens within a bucket using a Gumbel-top-k sample keyed by a secret, making the specific identity of survivors unpredictable to an observer who lacks the key. The paper proves (Propositions 1–2) that the cap bounds any L-second segment to at most (⌈L/W⌉+1)⌊ρB⌋ tokens of a budget B, and that the keyed draw gives every eligible token a non-zero survival probability each round, independent of its score.

Claim: Imposing a temporal quota (of any of three tested kinds) removes the worst-case accuracy collapse and beats the published InfiniPot-V baseline on two of three tested models

Across five natural "stressors" (calm, rapid cuts, burned-in text, flicker, camera shake), three VideoLLMs, and two memory budgets, the paper reports that adding any temporal-allocation rule — equal time-spans, a hard cap alone, or full KeyMem — removes the worst-case accuracy collapse that attention-based retention otherwise suffers on some models, and that these temporal quotas outperform the previously published InfiniPot-V retention rule by a wide margin on two of the three model families tested.

Claim: KeyMem's two-layer security design is explicitly modeled on, and named after, countermeasures developed against CPU cache side-channel timing attacks — partitioned caches and randomized (keyed) caches

The paper's own framing states that it is deliberately transplanting a solution from hardware security into ML systems. It frames the VideoLLM memory-eviction problem as structurally identical to the shared-CPU-cache side-channel problem solved by Prime+Probe/Evict+Time-style timing attacks, and states that it carries over the two standard hardware defenses — partitioned caches (bounding any one user's/domain's share of a shared cache) and randomized/keyed caches (mapping addresses with a secret key so an attacker cannot predict which lines are evicted) — directly into the VideoLLM's token memory as KeyMem's two layers. The threat model section also explicitly invokes Kerckhoffs's principle (the adversary is assumed to know everything about the system except the secret key) to justify evaluating the keyed-sampling layer.

Claim: Secret-keyed sampling measurably helps only against a simulating adaptive adversary, not under natural stress, and even there does not reliably beat simple deterministic quotas

Under natural stress conditions (the five stressors above), the paper reports that the keyed draw adds no measurable benefit over deterministic temporal quotas — "the 18 paired intervals of KeyMem against the two deterministic quotas all include zero." The keyed sampling only shows a measurable advantage under a specifically constructed adaptive adversary that is assumed (per Kerckhoffs's principle) to know the model, policy, budget, quota and bucket grid, and that simulates the memory offline to choose which natural footage to insert and when — and even there, a secret key does not consistently outperform the best deterministic quota, only a leaked one.

Further leads

Entity candidates

No genuinely close collision was found with the retrieved related vault notes (the AI-supply-chain, hexels, Altair/BASIC, and rationality-continuity-problem notes surfaced by retrieval); this paper's subject — streaming-video-LLM KV-cache eviction and its borrowing from CPU cache-side-channel security — does not overlap their content, so no wikilinks were forced.

Source

Tier 1 Wei Song, Yuxin Cao, Xiao Cheng, Christy Jie Liang, Xi Zheng, Leo Yu Zhang Wed Nov 18
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2611.25649
written by claude-sonnet-5 · batch run 2026-11-21 · raw markdown