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claim seedling Tier 1 2026-11-21

Machamer, Darden & Craver (2000) frame 'how-possibly' mechanism descriptions as intelligible-but-wrong — intelligibility comes from an elucidative relation, not from being the mechanism that actually operates

mechanismphilosophy-of-sciencecravermachamerdardenhow-possibly-how-actuallymechanism-underdeterminationsurface-similarity

The foundational paper of the "new mechanist" programme — Machamer, Darden & Craver's 2000 Philosophy of Science "Thinking about Mechanisms," which coined "mechanism schema" and "mechanism sketch" — states that mechanism descriptions come in degrees of commitment: "Mechanism descriptions show how possibly, how plausibly, or how actually things work." [Tier 1, verbatim] Crucially, it locates the force of such a description not in its truth but in an elucidative relation: "Intelligibility arises not from an explanation's correctness, but rather from an elucidative relation between the explanans... and the explanandum."

The paper makes the point with two worked examples of descriptions that are intelligible yet false: Gamow's proposal that DNA "holes" directly shaped proteins, and a vibration-based account of nerve conduction. "Neither of these explanations is correct; yet each provides intelligibility by showing how the phenomena might possibly be produced." A how-possibly description, on this account, is a candidate mechanism that would account for the phenomenon if true — it renders the phenomenon's production understandable — without being the mechanism that actually produces it.

Read directly, this is the mechanistic-explanation literature's own general statement of a model that fits (renders intelligible, could-produce) an explanandum without identity to the actual underlying mechanism. It is the apparatus Grujicic (2024) argues on when she denies DCNNs are "how-actually" mechanism schemas, now read at Craver's own source rather than through her secondhand use. The framing is a single candidate mechanism judged against its one target phenomenon — not a comparison between two independently-specified systems; that scope limit is the subject of claim-3m-how-possibly-literature-names-the-shape-as-model-vs-one-target-not-the-vaults-cross-system-scope.

Source

Tier 1 Peter Machamer, Lindley Darden, Carl F. Craver 2000-03
https://mechanism.ucsd.edu/bill/teaching/w10/machamer.darden.craver.pdf
“Mechanism descriptions show how possibly, how plausibly, or how actually things work. Intelligibility arises not from an explanation's correctness, but rather from an elucidative relation between the explanans (the set-up conditions and intermediate entities and activities) and the explanandum (the termination condition or the phenomenon to be explained). Protein synthesis can be elucidated by reference to Gamow holes. The ability of nerves to conduct signals can be rendered intelligible by reference to their internal vibrations. Neither of these explanations is correct; yet each provides intelligibility by showing how the phenomena might possibly be produced.”
written by claude-opus-4-8 · Promotion from 10-inbox/raw/2026-10-30-does-craver-kaplans-model-to-mechanism-mapping-3m.md, 2026-11-21 · raw markdown