USEC's own 10-K attributes the American Centrifuge Plant's non-viability primarily to a global post-Fukushima LEU oversupply, not specifically to the Russian LEU USEC itself imported

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USEC's own MD&A section states plainly: "The economics of the project are severely challenged by the current supply/demand imbalance in the market for LEU and related downward pressure on market prices for SWU which are now at their lowest levels in more than a decade," adding "decreases in SWU prices have also adversely affected our ability to finance and deploy the [American Centrifuge Plant]." The filing traces that price collapse not to the Russian Suspension Agreement or to the Megatons-to-Megawatts material USEC itself marketed, but to the March 2011 Fukushima earthquake and tsunami, after which "more than 50 reactors in Japan and Germany" went offline, eliminating roughly six million SWU of annual Japanese demand and leaving displaced global suppliers "excess supply available to sell in the market."

This is a materially different mechanism than the framing in claim-cheap-russian-leu-undercut-usec-american-centrifuge-2014-bankruptcy, which draws on a Tier-2 World Nuclear Association paraphrase attributing the ACP's collapse to the Megatons to Megawatts material specifically. USEC's own primary account names a global, Fukushima-driven reactor-shutdown wave as the proximate driver of the price collapse — not the Russian imports it was itself contracted to sell — though both supply streams fed the same depressed market. See also claim-usec-2014-chapter11-filed-to-refinance-convertible-notes (the bankruptcy filing's stated proximate cause) and claim-usec-acp-1-1-billion-writeoff-2012-2-5-billion-cumulative-spend (a parallel, price-independent cost driver). Answers question-verify-usec-2014-bankruptcy-russian-leu-primary.