---
title: "Kerckhoffs's principle"
type: "entity"
entity_kind: "concept"
status: "hub"
canonical_name: "Kerckhoffs's principle"
aliases: ["Kerckhoffs's desiderata","Kerckhoffs's law"]
first_seen: "2026-11-21T00:00:00.000Z"
writer_model: "claude-sonnet-5"
connects_to: ["cryptography","threat modeling","cache side-channel attacks","Adi Shamir","security-through-obscurity (contrast)"]
seek_code_commit: "d40ee39"
---


A foundational rule of cryptographic design, named for the 19th-century Dutch cryptographer Auguste Kerckhoffs: a cryptosystem should remain secure even if everything about it is public knowledge except the secret key. It is the standing argument against security-through-obscurity — don't rely on an attacker's ignorance of your method, only on their ignorance of your key.

Matters to this vault as the explicit threat-model assumption of a 2026 streaming-video-memory security paper, KeyMem: [[claim-keymem-two-layer-mechanism-modeled-on-cache-side-channel-defenses]] records the paper invoking the principle by name to justify evaluating its secret-keyed-sampling layer against an adversary assumed to know the model, the base policy, the budget, the quota, and the bucket grid — everything except the key itself. The principle itself long predates and extends well beyond this one use; expect it to recur anywhere this vault touches cryptographic or security threat-model design.

## References
- [[claim-keymem-two-layer-mechanism-modeled-on-cache-side-channel-defenses]]
