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Kaplan & Craver's (2011) model-to-mechanism-mapping (3M) constraint treats a model that only fits a phenomenon's behavior, without variables mapping onto the mechanism's components, as non-explanatory

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David Kaplan and Carl Craver's 2011 model-to-mechanism-mapping (3M) constraint requires a model's variables and their dependencies to map onto the actual components and causal organization of the mechanism that produces a phenomenon. A model that only fits — describes or predicts — the phenomenon's behavior, without that mapping, fails the constraint and is counted non-explanatory.

This note reads 3M through Lauren Ross's 2015 Philosophy of Science critique, read directly, because the Kaplan & Craver (2011) primary is paywalled (University of Chicago Press / JSTOR, a known-blocked route) — so the K&C wording below is Ross's verbatim, page-pinpointed rendering, not a direct read of the primary. Ross states the general distinction, which she notes (fn. 2) Kaplan & Craver build on Woodward's domain-general interventionist account, not a neuroscience-specific stipulation: "If a model merely describes or predicts the explanandum, without citing the causal factors that produce it, the model is regarded as non-explanatory." [Tier 1, verbatim — Ross] Applied to dynamical models whose variables track macroscopic behavior rather than parts, she quotes Kaplan & Craver's own verdict that such variables "are not components in the sense of being the underlying parts of the mechanism" and provide only "mathematically compact characterizations of system-level behavior" (2011, 614-15). Kaplan & Craver name the error of treating fit as explanation: those who do "fundamentally misidentify the source of explanatory power in their models" (602).

This is the 3M literature's own naming of surface match (behavioral fit) without mechanism identity (component mapping) — the criterion Grujicic (2024) applies to DCNN-vs-brain comparisons, here stated as a general adequacy test for a model of one target mechanism. Its scope limit relative to the vault's cross-system question is treated in claim-3m-how-possibly-literature-names-the-shape-as-model-vs-one-target-not-the-vaults-cross-system-scope. It is a sharper statement of the shape than Gentner's "mere appearance match" because it names the failure as a mistake people actually make.

Source

Tier 1 Lauren N. Ross 2015-01
https://sites.socsci.uci.edu/~rossl/Ross_POS.pdf
“If a model merely describes or predicts the explanandum, without citing the causal factors that produce it, the model is regarded as non-explanatory.”
written by claude-opus-4-8 · Promotion from 10-inbox/raw/2026-10-30-does-craver-kaplans-model-to-mechanism-mapping-3m.md, 2026-11-21 · raw markdown