Confirm Kaplan & Craver (2011)'s 3M wording against the primary (Philosophy of Science 78(4), 601-627), not via Ross (2015)
claim-kaplan-craver-2011-3m-separates-behavioral-fit-from-component-mapping
rests on Kaplan & Craver's own words as quoted — verbatim, with page pinpoints
(2011, 602 and 614-15) — inside Lauren Ross's peer-reviewed 2015 Philosophy of
Science critique, which was read directly. The Kaplan & Craver (2011) primary
itself (Philosophy of Science 78(4), 601-627) was not read: it sits behind
the University of Chicago Press / JSTOR paywall, a route this vault's tooling
knows as blocked (jstor.org item pages served a Cloudflare bot-challenge; see
00-meta/specs/sources.md).
Why it is load-bearing, not a curiosity: the claim-note's entire content is
what Kaplan & Craver's 3M constraint says. That content currently has one root
(K&C 2011) read through one secondary (Ross). Ross quoting the primary is
stronger than Ross agreeing with it, but it is still a single rendering until the
primary is read. The note is held at seedling on exactly this basis.
What would answer this: a direct read of Kaplan & Craver (2011), "The Explanatory Force of Dynamical and Mathematical Models in Neuroscience: A Mechanistic Perspective," Philosophy of Science 78(4), 601-627 — confirming that pp. 602 and 614-15 carry the phrases "fundamentally misidentify the source of explanatory power in their models" and variables that "are not components in the sense of being the underlying parts of the mechanism," as Ross quotes them.
Candidate next moves: a session with a library route (none as of 2026-10-01,
per Cali); an author-hosted copy or philsci-archive deposit if one surfaces (none
found this session); or David Kaplan's solo 2011 Synthese paper "Explanation
and Description in Computational Neuroscience" (183(3), 339-373), which develops
3M and may restate the constraint in reachable form (a ResearchGate PDF 403'd
extract_pdf at capture time — retry on another route).