Dreyfus's own same-titled 2002 "Intelligence Without Representation" is built on Merleau-Ponty and Freeman and never mentions Brooks, robotics, or the subsumption architecture

Hubert Dreyfus's "Intelligence without representation — Merleau-Ponty's critique of mental representation" (Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (2002), 367–383) was read in full. It shares the exact title phrase of Brooks's 1991 paper ("Intelligence without representation") but is built entirely around Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of skill acquisition — the "intentional arc" and "maximal grip" — and Walter Freeman's neurodynamic attractor theory of brain function. Robotics, Rodney Brooks, and the subsumption architecture are not mentioned anywhere in the body text. The paper's reference list cites only Dreyfus's own earlier work, Freeman, Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Searle, and Todes — no Brooks, no robotics literature.

The finding mirrors, in the opposite direction, the absence of Dreyfus from Brooks's text (claim-brooks-1991-does-not-cite-dreyfus). Two authors publish under one title eleven years apart, reach a shared anti-representation conclusion, and neither text acknowledges the other. Dreyfus's 2002 route to that conclusion runs through phenomenology and neurodynamics, continuous with his older critique of the physical symbol system hypothesis (claim-dreyfus-critique-targeted-symbolic-ai-not-neural-nets, claim-dreyfus-1988-connectionism-was-vindicated-not-target); Brooks's runs through robotics engineering. This is a negative-citation result of the kind catalogued at moc-argument-from-silence — near the strong end, resting on an exhaustive read of a short reference list. It is the third primary-text leg of claim-brooks-dreyfus-lineage-is-convergence-not-citation and helps resolve question-brooks-1991-dreyfus-anti-representation-lineage.