In the same 1972 passage, Dreyfus's engagement with Polanyi is critical, not endorsement — he argues Polanyi's own account of rule-following undermines Polanyi's point

michael-polanyihubert-dreyfustacit-knowledgeai-critiquephilosophy-of-aiprimary-sourcephenomenology

The same endnote (Chapter 7, note 32) that sources Dreyfus's "interiorise" quote from Michael Polanyi in claim-dreyfus-1972-wccd-names-quotes-polanyi-as-embodied-skill-source continues with Dreyfus's own editorial aside: "Polanyi again defeats his own point by adding in a later account of language learning" — quoting Polanyi's "Sense-giving and Sense Reading" (in Knowing and Being, 1969, p. 200) on a child learning "a vast set of complex rules... intelligible only to a handful of experts" through "subsidiary practice of ingenious rules of which the subject remains focally ignorant." Dreyfus reads this as Polanyi lapsing back into exactly the rule-governed account of skill acquisition that Dreyfus's own argument is trying to refute.

This narrows how the Polanyi–Dreyfus relationship should be characterized. Dreyfus treats Polanyi as a real interlocutor — worth naming, quoting twice, and arguing with on a specific point of substance — which is a stronger form of engagement than a stray citation, but it is critical engagement rather than uncomplicated agreement or discipleship. The "influence" language of claim-michael-polanyis-epistemology-influenced-dreyfus-critique-of-first-generation-ai is accurate as far as it goes, but a reader expecting Dreyfus to have simply adopted Polanyi's account of tacit skill would be wrong: Dreyfus uses Polanyi's language of "dwelling in" a tool as scaffolding for his own argument while explicitly rejecting the part of Polanyi's account that reintroduces rules.