Égré & Icard's 2018 chapter defines imprecision and indeterminacy as two sub-varieties of one phenomenon (vagueness), not as two independent axes

epistemicsvaguenessformal-logicintelligence-tradecraftprimary-source-verification

The chapter's own Figure 1, captioned "Varieties of linguistic vagueness," shows a single top node, "Vagueness," splitting into two branches — "Imprecision (pragmatic)" and "Indeterminacy (semantic)" — each splitting further ("Generality"/"Approximation" under Imprecision; "Degree-vagueness"/"Open-texture" under Indeterminacy). The prose states the same structure directly: "Following several authors (see Pinkal 1995; Kennedy 2007; Solt 2015), we argue that generality and approximation are fundamentally cases of pragmatic imprecision, whereas degree-vagueness and open-texture are semantic phenomena, directly affecting the truth-conditions of expressions."

In the chapter's own usage, imprecision means a speaker choosing to be less informative than they could be (generality, approximation) while remaining semantically determinate; indeterminacy means the expression itself lacks fixed truth-conditions (degree-vagueness, open-texture), independent of speaker intent. Both are manifestations of one underlying phenomenon — vagueness — arranged as a taxonomy of that single concept, not as two independently-varying dimensions crossed against each other.

This matters because the "Indeterminate"/"Imprecise" cell-labels in Icard's later 3×3 honesty×truth taxonomy are drawn from this chapter's naming — see claim-icard-2023-honesty-truth-crossing-not-inherited-from-egre-or-kent-primaries for what that borrowing does and doesn't carry over.