D'Ariano and Faggin's QIP grounds unshareable, private experience in quantum no-cloning: only nonclassical information cannot be read or copied without disturbance

faggindarianopanpsychismquantum-informationno-cloningconsciousnessmechanismqualia

The mechanism underneath Quantum Information Panpsychism is an argument from the physics of information, stated in D'Ariano and Faggin's own primary paper (arXiv:2012.06580). The paper posits a "Privacy principle" (P2): "Experience is not sharable, even in principle." From there it reasons: "information shareability is equivalent to information readability with no disturbance," and "Recently it has been proved that the only theory where any information can be extracted without disturbance is classical information theory. We conclude that P2 implies that a theory of consciousness needs nonclassical information theory, namely QT, or else a 'post-quantum' OPT." The privacy argument therefore rules classical information out; it does not by itself rule quantum theory in. Quantum theory enters by a separate stipulation one paragraph later — principle P2', "Quantumness of experience: The information theory of consciousness is quantum theory" — justified on the ground that QT is "the best known instance of OPT," with the paper explicitly leaving the door open: "In place of QT, one may consider a post-quantum OPT — e.g. RQT (QT on real Hilbert spaces), FQT (Fermionic QT), PRB (an OPT build on Popescu-Rohlich boxes), etc. …, yet some of the features of the present consciousness theory can be translated into the other OPT, as long as the notion of 'entanglement' survives in the considered OPT."

A footnote makes the cloning connection explicit — "information shareability is equivalent to the possibility of making copies of it — technically cloning information." Classical information can be freely cloned; quantum information, by the no-cloning theorem, cannot. So no classical information can underwrite an experience that is intrinsically private and non-reproducible — which is the argument's actual reach, quantum theory being the instance of nonclassical theory the authors then select rather than the one the argument forces. This is the technical spine of Faggin's structural-impossibility argument against machine consciousness (claim-faggin-4004-designer-argues-classical-silicon-cannot-be-conscious): classical computation is defined by freely copyable states, and on this account that very copyability disqualifies it from bearing subjective experience.

As a specific technical-mechanism claim it is sourced to the Tier-1 primary paper directly, not to a secondary description, and clears the sourcing floor for mechanism claims. It resolves the mechanism half of question-verify-faggin-irreducible-qualia-quote. It stays seedling as a fresh promotion of an unrefereed preprint; together with claim-quantum-information-panpsychism-is-dariano-and-faggins-own-term it is the second of two vault notes resting on arXiv:2012.06580, within the three-note single-source concentration cap.