Resource-rational analysis's own history-of-rationality section cites Oaksford & Chater's Bayesian Rationality (2007) and places its probability-based norm as the predecessor standard resource-rationality supersedes — the resemblance is real, carried by lineage more than by the citation itself

resource-rationalityrational-analysisoaksford-chaterbayesian-cognitioncognitive-sciencerationalitybounded-rationalitycross-domain-bridgebridge-seed-check

BRIDGE-SEED DISCIPLINE checked first. 10-inbox/raw/ was searched for a prior capture mentioning both claim-oaksford-chater-redefine-rationality-as-reasoning-about-uncertainty and claim-resource-rational-analysis-formalizes-utility-minus-compute-cost by slug. None exists. The closest sibling, 2026-09-20-bipartite-two-things-this-vault-knows-in-different.md, checked a different cosine-0.85 pairing: the same resource-rational claim-note against Oaksford & Chater's 1994 Wason-task recast, not against the uncertainty-redefinition claim investigated here. That capture is not duplicated; it is reused below as background and extended with new findings about the other Oaksford-Chater claim-note's relationship to the same target article.

Verdict: the resemblance is real, but it runs through genealogy more than through engagement. Resource-rational analysis's own target article (Lieder & Griffiths 2020) cites Oaksford & Chater's Bayesian Rationality (2007) — the exact book the uncertainty-redefinition claim is drawn from — directly in its text and reference list (Claim 1 below). More substantively, the same article's own telling of "a brief history of rationality" places probability theory as one of three classical normative standards that human behaviour is said to violate and that resource-rational analysis sets out to supersede (Claim 2) — meaning Oaksford & Chater's logic-to-probability revision of the rationality standard is the immediately preceding link in the very lineage resource-rational analysis explicitly narrates itself as continuing. The target article then performs the identical rhetorical move Oaksford & Chater are known for — swap the normative standard, watch "irrationality" partly dissolve — in its own words, naming itself as "revisiting the debate about human rationality" (Claim 3). The citation itself (Claim 1) is thin: one name among five in a background list, not an engagement with the uncertainty-vs- logic thesis specifically. The lineage and rhetorical-shape findings (Claims 2–3) are what make the resemblance more than coincidence.

Claim: Lieder & Griffiths (2020) cite Oaksford & Chater's Bayesian Rationality (2007) — the exact book behind the uncertainty-redefinition claim — in the target article's own account of rationality's history across disciplines

Claim type: historical/citation-existence (a bibliographic fact about what a paper cites — checkable directly against the primary text). Tier 3–4 would suffice; sourced at Tier 1 via direct primary read.

Opening section 2 ("A brief history of rationality"), Lieder & Griffiths write that "notions of rationality have a long history and have been influential across multiple scientific disciplines," naming per-discipline examples; for psychology the parenthetical list is "(Braine 1978; Chater et al. 2006; Griffiths et al. 2010; Newell et al. 1958; Oaksford & Chater 2007)." The reference list resolves this to "Oaksford, M. & Chater, N. (2007) Bayesian rationality: The probabilistic approach to human reasoning (Oxford cognitive science). Oxford University Press" — tagged [aFL], i.e. cited in the main text by lead author Falk Lieder. This is the identical book the vault's claim-note claim-oaksford-chater-redefine-rationality-as-reasoning-about-uncertainty draws its "rationality is defined instead by the ability to reason about uncertainty" quote from (via its 2009 Behavioral and Brain Sciences précis).

This citation sits in a background list of five works illustrating that "notions of rationality" have mattered to psychology — it is not an engagement with Oaksford & Chater's specific logic-vs-uncertainty argument. The next sentence in the same paragraph describes "the classic notion of rationality... according to which people act to maximize their expected utility, reason based on the laws of logic, and handle uncertainty according to probability theory" without separately flagging that Oaksford & Chater's own thesis argues against the logic half of that classic notion. The citation establishes that the target article knows and cites the book; it does not by itself establish that the target article engages its argument.

Provenance:

• source_url: https://cocosci.princeton.edu/papers/lieder_resource.pdf
• source_sha: 6c61b43dc361ea3fe39d1c33bc945ba1c32916920b3a45f8f19f0c0574503680 (re-fetched via extract_pdf this session; identical sha to the 2026-09-20 capture's fetch, confirming cache integrity; tls: "verified")
• source_title: "Resource-rational analysis: Understanding human cognition as the optimal use of limited computational resources"
• source_author: Falk Lieder and Thomas L. Griffiths
• source_date: 2020-01-18
• source_venue: Behavioral and Brain Sciences 43, e1, Cambridge University Press
• source_tier: 1
• exact quote, in-text list (two-column PDF-extraction seam splits this across lines, grounded as two adjoining fragments per the Quote-shape rule — the right-column text is contiguous once the interleaved left-column author-bio text is stripped): "psychology (Braine 1978; Chater et al. 2006;" + "Griffiths et al. 2010; Newell et al. 1958; Oaksford & Chater" + "2007), neuroscience (Knill & Pouget 2004), sociology" — all three fragments independently grounded via quote_check against the extracted primary text.
• exact quote, reference-list identity (grounded): "Oaksford, M. & Chater, N. (2007) Bayesian rationality: The probabilistic approach to" + "human reasoning (Oxford cognitive science). Oxford University Press. [aFL]"

Claim: the target article's own history names "probability theory" — the exact standard Oaksford & Chater say rationality should be redefined around — as one of three classical norms that resource-rational analysis sets out to supersede, placing Oaksford & Chater's revision one step earlier in the same lineage

Claim type: structural/historical claim about how the primary text narrates its own intellectual lineage — Tier 3–4 acceptable for this kind; sourced at Tier 1 via direct quotation.

Lieder & Griffiths write that "human judgment and decision-making systematically violate the axioms of rational modeling frameworks such as expected utility theory (Kahneman & Tversky 1979), logic (Wason 1968), and probability theory (Tversky & Kahneman 1973; 1974)" — treating probability theory itself as one of three classical normative standards (alongside expected utility and logic) that human behaviour is said to violate, prior to resource-rational analysis's own revision. Later, summarizing their contribution, they write that "since bounded optimality provides a much more realistic normative standard than did expected utility theory, logic, and probability theory, we might find that our minds are much more rational than we thought" — again grouping probability theory with logic and expected utility as superseded predecessors.

This matters for the bridge because Oaksford & Chater's whole project, per the vault's existing claim-note, is to replace logic with probability as the rationality standard ("rationality is defined instead by the ability to reason about uncertainty"). Lieder & Griffiths's own historical narrative treats that already-revised standard (probability theory) as itself one of the classical norms people violate and that resource rationality further revises by subtracting a compute-cost term. In the target article's own telling, Oaksford & Chater's move is not a separate, unrelated episode sitting next to resource-rational analysis — it is the immediately preceding step in the identical sequence of rationality-standard revisions that the target article narrates itself as the latest instalment of.

Provenance:

• Same primary as above, same source_sha.
• exact quote: "human judgment and decision-making systematically violate the" + "axioms of rational modeling frameworks such as expected utility" + "theory (Kahneman & Tversky 1979), logic (Wason 1968), and" + "probability theory (Tversky & Kahneman 1973; 1974)." (four fragments, each independently grounded via quote_check; the PDF's two-column extraction splits the sentence across these line boundaries)
• exact quote: "since bounded optimality provides a much more realistic normative standard than did expected utility theory," + "logic, and probability theory, we might find that our minds are" + "much more rational than we thought." (three fragments, each independently grounded via quote_check)
• source_tier: 1

Claim: resource-rational analysis's own "Rationality revisited" section performs, in its own words, the exact rhetorical move the vault already catalogues as Oaksford & Chater's signature — redefine the rationality standard, and apparent irrationality partly dissolves

Claim type: structural/rhetorical claim about a documented pattern across the primary text and the vault's own existing note — Tier 3–4 acceptable; sourced at Tier 1 via direct quotation.

The vault's existing claim-note on Oaksford & Chater already identifies a "single rhetorical shape" — "humans aren't irrational, the yardstick was wrong" — shared with Gigerenzer's ecological rationality. Lieder & Griffiths's target article performs the identical move in its own words. Section 5.4, "Rationality revisited," opens: "Research is now revisiting the debate about human rationality with resource rationality as a more realistic normative standard." The same section proposes that "we should redefine the term 'cognitive bias' as a violation of resource rationality rather than as a violation of logic, probability theory, or expected utility theory" — explicitly swapping the normative yardstick, exactly as Oaksford & Chater swap logic for probability, and exactly as the vault's note states Gigerenzer swaps optimality-via-logic for optimality-via-ecological-fit.

This is the strongest form of the bridge available from this source: not merely that resource-rational analysis cites Oaksford & Chater (Claim 1, thin) or descends from the same classical-standards lineage (Claim 2, structural), but that the target article consciously narrates itself as "revisiting the debate about human rationality" — the same debate, with the same rhetorical shape, that the vault already named as Oaksford & Chater's contribution before this capture connected resource-rational analysis to it.

Provenance:

• Same primary as above, same source_sha.
• exact quote: "Research is now revisiting the debate about human rationality" + "with resource rationality as a more realistic normative standard." (two fragments, independently grounded via quote_check)
• exact quote: "we should redefine the term "cognitive bias" as a violation of" + "resource rationality rather than as a violation of logic, probability" + "theory, or expected utility theory." (three fragments, independently grounded via quote_check; inner double-quote marks around "cognitive bias" reproduced as printed)
• source_tier: 1

Further leads

• observation-oaksford-chater-wason-resource-rational-pairing-is-confirmed-bridge-via-citation (2026-09-20) already established that the same target article cites Oaksford & Chater's 1994 Wason-task paper and Chater & Oaksford's 1999 "rational analysis" retrospective by name — a tighter, worked-example-level citation than the background listing found in this capture for the 2007 book. The two captures together show the target article citing Oaksford & Chater three separate times across three different papers (1994, 1999, 2007) — worth a future check of whether that crosses the vault's single-source-concentration cap if more claims are drawn from this one PDF.
• Hahn & Oaksford (2007), "The rationality of informal argumentation" — also cited by Lieder & Griffiths (tag [aFL]), a third Oaksford co-authorship in the same reference list, not opened this session (flagged already in the 2026-09-20 capture).
• Sanborn & Chater (2016), "Bayesian brains without probabilities" (Trends in Cognitive Sciences) — cited by Lieder & Griffiths in the discussion of reasoning (section 5.1.3) as a way to "resolve this apparent contradiction" between cognitive constraints and Bayesian reasoning; a fourth Chater citation (without Oaksford) in the same source, unexplored.
• The open peer commentary by Atmanspacher, Basieva, Busemeyer, Khrennikov, Pothos, Shiffrin & Wang ("What are the appropriate axioms of rationality for reasoning under resource-constrained systems?") directly disputes the target article's reliance on Bayesian/Kolmogorov probability axioms and proposes quantum probability theory instead — a live, unresolved debate about exactly which "uncertainty" formalism rationality should be redefined around, adjacent to but not engaged by this capture.
• Sosis, C. & Bishop, M. (2014), "Rationality" (Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science), is cited by Lieder & Griffiths as the source for "the classic notion of rationality" definition — not opened this session; could be a useful Tier 1-2 primary for the vault's broader "rationality was mismeasured" thread the existing claim-note's commentary gestures toward.

Safety flags

None. The Lieder & Griffiths 2020 PDF (cocosci.princeton.edu, re-fetched via extract_pdf, tls: "verified") is ordinary academic prose, an abstract, equations, boxed methodology summaries, open peer commentaries (including one proposing quantum-probability axioms as a rival normative standard — a substantive scholarly disagreement, not a safety signal), and a reference list — no addressed-to-AI language, override language, claimed authority, tier self-assignment, file-system instructions, credential requests, or urgency framing encountered in any section read this session.

Entity candidates

• Daniel Kahneman — person — one of the two foundational, older figures (with Tversky) whose documented "violations" of expected utility, logic, and probability theory define the classical rationality standard that both Oaksford & Chater's uncertainty-redefinition and resource-rational analysis's utility-minus-cost formalism are explicitly built to revise (Claim 2 above quotes Lieder & Griffiths citing "Kahneman & Tversky 1979" and "Tversky & Kahneman 1973; 1974" as the sources of the very violations both frameworks seek to re-explain). Flagged first, per the ancestry-priority convention, as the older figure the whole lineage is measured against — not a co-author of either seed claim's own papers. No entity-daniel-kahneman.md exists in the vault yet.
• Amos Tversky — person — the other half of the same foundational partnership; same rationale as Kahneman above. No entity-amos-tversky.md exists yet.
• Peter Wason — already has entity-peter-wason.md — confirmation, not a new flag. This capture adds that Wason (1968) is cited by Lieder & Griffiths as the specific source of the "logic" violation in the same three-way classical-standards list (expected utility / logic / probability) that this capture's Claim 2 rests on — a concrete link from the existing Wason entity page to the resource-rational-analysis claim cluster that the page may not yet carry.
• Nick Chater, Mike Oaksford, Falk Lieder, Thomas Griffiths — already have entity pages per the retrieve-before-write list (entity-nick-chater, entity-mike-oaksford, entity-falk-lieder) — confirmation, not a new flag. This capture's Claim 1 adds a fact their pages may not yet carry: Oaksford & Chater's 2007 book Bayesian Rationality is independently cited by Lieder & Griffiths (2020), a third and distinct citation link beyond the 1994 and 1999 papers the 2026-09-20 capture already recorded.