Resource-rational analysis

A cognitive-science paradigm advanced by Falk Lieder and Thomas L. Griffiths (target article, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 43, e1, 2020) that explains human cognition as the optimal use of limited computational resources. It extends Anderson's rational analysis (claim-rational-analysis-anderson-optimal-solution-marr-level) from predicting behaviour off the environment's structure to predicting cognitive mechanisms from internal resources plus the environment, pushing the program toward Marr's algorithmic level. Formally it scores a heuristic by expected utility minus an explicit opportunity-cost term on the compute it consumes, and derives the algorithm that best trades resource cost against approximation accuracy. Its "bounded" half descends from Horvitz and Russell's bounded optimality, not from Werbos's approximate dynamic programming.

References

• claim-resource-rational-analysis-extends-andersons-rational-analysis — self-described extension of Anderson, toward Marr's algorithmic level
• claim-resource-rational-analysis-descends-from-bounded-optimality-not-werbos-adp — its actual AI antecedent is bounded optimality, not Werbos's ADP
• claim-resource-rational-analysis-formalizes-utility-minus-compute-cost — the utility-minus-cost formalism (Eq 3/4)
• observation-resource-rational-analysis-confirms-anderson-leg-not-werbos-leg — confirms the Anderson leg, not the Werbos leg, of the optimization-as-theory-of-mind bridge
• Bridge context: claim-optimization-as-theory-of-mind-two-lineages
• claim-lieder-griffiths-2020-cite-oaksford-chater-1994-as-worked-example — the target article cites Oaksford & Chater's 1994 Wason-task paper by name
• claim-lieder-griffiths-2020-name-chater-oaksford-1999-as-rational-analysis-source — and, at the one place the article formally introduces the paradigm, hangs the citation for the name "rational analysis" on Chater & Oaksford's 1999 retrospective rather than on Anderson's 1990 book; elsewhere in the same article the term is cited to Anderson (1990) alone, twice
• observation-oaksford-chater-wason-resource-rational-pairing-is-confirmed-bridge-via-citation — confirms the resemblance to Oaksford & Chater's Wason-task work is a direct citation, not shared ancestry

Updates

• 2026-10-02: the genealogy above ("extends Anderson's rational analysis") sharpens one level further — the target article also cites Oaksford & Chater's own 1994 and 1999 papers by name, not just Anderson's. Found independently in two sibling bridge-check sessions (2026-09-19, 2026-09-20); this page had not been updated with the fact despite being the obvious hub for it. (observation-oaksford-chater-wason-resource-rational-pairing-is-confirmed-bridge-via-citation)
• 2026-10-03 (propagation-repair): the 1999 reference line above is narrowed to match the corrected parent note. Was: "and cites Chater & Oaksford's 1999 retrospective for the name 'rational analysis' itself" — an unqualified scope claim. Now: the 1999 citation is hung on the name only at the one place the article formally introduces the paradigm; elsewhere in the same article "rational analysis" is cited to Anderson (1990) alone, twice earlier (pp. 1 and 2). The 1994 worked-example line and the confirmed-bridge verdict are unaffected. (claim-lieder-griffiths-2020-name-chater-oaksford-1999-as-rational-analysis-source)
• 2026-10-10: the paradigm narrates itself as the latest in a lineage of rationality-standard revisions. Its §1 introduction lists probability theory alongside expected utility and logic as a classical norm it supersedes — the same triple restated in §2, its "brief history" (claim-lieder-griffiths-2020-list-probability-theory-among-three-classical-norms-resource-rationality-supersedes), placing Oaksford & Chater's logic-to-probability move one step earlier in the same sequence; and its §5.4 "Rationality revisited" redefines "cognitive bias" as a violation of resource rationality rather than of logic/probability/expected utility (claim-resource-rational-analysis-rationality-revisited-swaps-normative-yardstick-same-move-as-oaksford-chater) — the same swap-the-yardstick move the vault catalogues for Oaksford & Chater and Gigerenzer. A third Oaksford & Chater citation also turned up: their 2007 Bayesian Rationality book in a background list (claim-lieder-griffiths-2020-cite-oaksford-chater-2007-bayesian-rationality-in-background-list). The uncertainty-redefinition pairing is a hedged, genealogical bridge, distinct from the confirmed Wason pairing (observation-oaksford-chater-uncertainty-redefinition-resource-rational-pairing-is-genealogical-bridge).
• 2026-10-24: a disjoint lineage reaches this paradigm's core move independently and earlier. Halpern & Pass's "Algorithmic Rationality: Game Theory with Costly Computation" (arXiv:1412.2993 / JET 2015, drafted 2007) charges players' utility for computation — structurally the same utility-minus-compute-cost objective as claim-resource-rational-analysis-formalizes-utility-minus-compute-cost — and proposes using cost of computation to explain away behavioral-economics "irrationality," the same bias-rehabilitating payoff as §5.4 (claim-resource-rational-analysis-rationality-revisited-swaps-normative-yardstick-same-move-as-oaksford-chater). Its stated ancestry (Simon, Neyman, Rubinstein) is from game theory, not from Anderson/Marr/Oaksford & Chater; Lieder & Griffiths list it as a near-synonym for their own paradigm. (claim-halpern-pass-reach-rationality-mismeasured-move-from-disjoint-game-theory-lineage)
• 2026-10-11 (propagation-repair): the section locator in the 2026-10-10 entry above is corrected to match the amended parent note. Was: "Its 'brief history' lists probability theory alongside expected utility and logic as a classical norm it supersedes" — attributing the three-norms violation list to §2 alone. Now: the quoted sentence ("human judgment and decision-making systematically violate the axioms of rational modeling frameworks such as expected utility theory … logic … and probability theory") is in §1 Introduction, among the "fundamental problems" of canonical rational theories; §2, "A brief history of rationality," carries a close parallel of the same triple, which is presumably how the two got conflated. The substance is unaffected — probability theory is still named as a superseded predecessor standard, and the Oaksford & Chater one-step-earlier placement stands. (claim-lieder-griffiths-2020-list-probability-theory-among-three-classical-norms-resource-rationality-supersedes)