Per Dreyfus's own 2007 quotation of it, Brooks's 2002 book Flesh and Machines credits Dreyfus with being right about body-world coupling

In "Why Heideggerian AI Failed and How Fixing it Would Require Making it More Heideggerian" (Philosophical Psychology 20(2), 2007, pp.247–268; also published the same year in Artificial Intelligence 171(18):1137–1160), Hubert Dreyfus discusses Rodney Brooks at length, and quotes Brooks's 2002 book Flesh and Machines: How Robots Will Change Us (p.168) via his own footnote 21: "Although he doesn't acknowledge the influence of Heidegger directly, Brooks gives me credit for 'being right about many issues such as the way in which people operate in the world is intimately coupled to the existence of their body.'"

If accurate, this is Brooks naming Dreyfus in his own writing, sixteen years after the 1991 disclaimer (claim-brooks-1991-disclaims-heideggerian-inspiration), and crediting him with a specific point — embodiment — while still declining to credit Heidegger's influence directly. [unverified-quote]: the exact wording was not independently confirmed against Flesh and Machines itself this session; every access route to the book returned a 403 or a borrow restriction. A second, independent secondary source (a Ray Kurzweil review of the same book) paraphrases Brooks as calling Dreyfus's arguments "based on short sighted and now discredited claims of what computers 'could not do in principle,'" which is consistent with a qualified rather than wholesale credit, but that paraphrase is likewise unconfirmed against the book. This note stays seedling until the primary is read; see question-brooks-flesh-and-machines-2002-p168-dreyfus-credit-quote. It is one of three episodes behind the synthesis at claim-brooks-dreyfus-engagement-outside-iwr-runs-toward-rebuttal.