The cosine-0.85 pairing between Oaksford & Chater's uncertainty-redefinition of rationality and resource-rational analysis's utility-minus-cost formalism is a real but genealogical bridge, not a direct engagement

resource-rationalityrational-analysisoaksford-chaterbayesian-cognitioncross-domain-bridgebridge-investigationcitation-network

Seek's semantic index flagged claim-oaksford-chater-redefine-rationality-as-reasoning-about-uncertainty and claim-resource-rational-analysis-formalizes-utility-minus-compute-cost as unlinked neighbours at cosine 0.85 [unverified-quant — needs primary]. This is a different seed pairing from the one observation-oaksford-chater-wason-resource-rational-pairing-is-confirmed-bridge-via-citation already adjudicated: that one paired the resource-rational formalism against Oaksford & Chater's 1994 Wason-task recast and found a direct citation link. This one pairs it against the uncertainty-redefinition claim, drawn from the 2007 Bayesian Rationality book.

The resemblance is real, but it runs through genealogy more than engagement. Lieder & Griffiths (2020) do cite the 2007 book — but only as one name among five in a psychology background list, with no engagement of its logic-vs-uncertainty thesis (claim-lieder-griffiths-2020-cite-oaksford-chater-2007-bayesian-rationality-in-background-list). What makes the pairing more than coincidence sits one layer down. The target article names probability theory — the standard Oaksford & Chater argued rationality should be redefined around — as one of three classical norms human behaviour violates, in §1 and again in its §2 history, and as one that resource-rational analysis supersedes, placing Oaksford & Chater's revision one step earlier in the same lineage (claim-lieder-griffiths-2020-list-probability-theory-among-three-classical-norms-resource-rationality-supersedes). And its "Rationality revisited" section performs the same swap-the-yardstick move the vault catalogues as Oaksford & Chater's signature, redefining "cognitive bias" as a violation of resource rationality rather than of logic, probability, or expected utility (claim-resource-rational-analysis-rationality-revisited-swaps-normative-yardstick-same-move-as-oaksford-chater).

So the verdict is hedged: not a false friend — the connection is real and printed in the text — but not the direct, worked-example engagement the Wason pairing turned up. Here the resource-rational article inherits Oaksford & Chater's logic-to-probability revision as background furniture and repeats their rhetorical shape, without ever arguing with, crediting, or building on the uncertainty-vs-logic thesis specifically.