Lieder & Griffiths (2020) list probability theory alongside expected utility and logic as a classical normative standard human behaviour violates and resource-rational analysis supersedes

resource-rationalityrational-analysisoaksford-chaterbayesian-cognitioncognitive-sciencerationalitybounded-rationalityhistory-of-psychology

Setting up the article in §1, Lieder & Griffiths list the "fundamental problems" of canonical rational theories, the first being that "human judgment and decision-making systematically violate the axioms of rational modeling frameworks such as expected utility theory (Kahneman & Tversky 1979), logic (Wason 1968), and probability theory (Tversky & Kahneman 1973; 1974)" — grouping probability theory with expected utility and logic as the three classical normative standards human behaviour is said to violate. The same triple is restated in §2, "A brief history of rationality," in the sentence on what shook these models' foundation, so the grouping is the article's standing framing rather than a one-off. Summarizing their own contribution in §7's closing paragraph, they repeat it again: "since bounded optimality provides a much more realistic normative standard than did expected utility theory, logic, and probability theory, we might find that our minds are much more rational than we thought." Everywhere it appears in this list, probability theory is named as a superseded predecessor standard, not as the new one.

This places Oaksford & Chater's move one step earlier in the same lineage. Their project (claim-oaksford-chater-redefine-rationality-as-reasoning-about-uncertainty) is to replace logic with probability as the yardstick — "rationality is defined instead by the ability to reason about uncertainty." Resource-rational analysis's own narrative treats that already-revised probabilistic standard as itself one of the classical norms people violate, which its utility-minus-compute-cost formalism (claim-resource-rational-analysis-formalizes-utility-minus-compute-cost) further revises by subtracting a resource-cost term. So in the target article's telling, Oaksford & Chater's logic-to-probability revision is not a separate episode sitting beside resource-rational analysis — it is the immediately preceding link in the sequence of rationality-standard revisions the article narrates itself as continuing. The link is genealogical rather than argued: the same article cites the 2007 Bayesian Rationality book only in a background list (claim-lieder-griffiths-2020-cite-oaksford-chater-2007-bayesian-rationality-in-background-list), never pausing to credit the logic-to-probability shift that makes "probability theory" available as a superseded standard in the first place. Wason (1968) is named here as the source of the "logic" violation (see entity-peter-wason); Anderson's rational analysis is the paradigm resource-rational analysis extends (claim-rational-analysis-anderson-optimal-solution-marr-level, entity-john-anderson).